the demand for which comes primarily from institutional investors -and in the increasing number of signatories of the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment. This initiative has managed to secure the commitment of more than 1,600 asset owners, investment managers and financial service providers who pledge to 'incorporate environmental, social and governance issues into their investment analysis and decision making processes '. 5 In focusing on institutional preferences for CSR, our aim is twofold. We first explore whether the widely used claim that the benefits of CSR tend to accrue in the long-run is convincing for market participants, which would mean that stocks of firms with high (low) corporate social performance tend to be preferred by institutions which have longer (shorter) investment horizons and keep their holdings unchanged for longer (shorter) periods. Secondly, previous studies have shown that a higher proportion of long-term institutional ownership decreases managerial myopia and reduces pressures on corporate executives to meet short-term goals (Bushee, 1998) . Hence, it would be reasonable to assume that firms with higher levels of longterm institutional owners have a greater capacity to utilise corporate resources in an effort to increases the firm's CSP in the future -and that they manage to do so. We investigate if this is indeed the case.
Our work contributes to the existing literature in three significant ways. Firstly, it provides evidence in line with the frequently theorised but very rarely empirically tested hypothesis that the beneficial, value-creating or risk-reducing financial effects of high CSP accrue in the longterm -and hence, that firms with high CSP should be more attractive to more long-term investors. Secondly, it innovatively distinguishes between long-term and short-term investors in a direct way using holdings-based data instead of assuming which investor is de facto a longterm or short-term one according to its operational/legal identity. Thirdly, our study also investigates the extent to which long-term institutional ownership is associated with future improvements in the social, environmental and governance performance of their holding firms.
We show that long-term institutional investment is positively related to corporate social performance whereas short-term institutional investment is negatively related to corporate social performance. Further investigation reveals that increased holdings of a firm by long-term investors are positively associated with future levels of corporate social performance. Hence, we provide evidence of a 'virtuous circle' between long-term investment and CSP, in line with the more generic findings of Waddock and Graves (1997) regarding the CSP-financial performance © Oikonomou et al, October 2017 5 link. Our results are useful for understanding what type of investor is attracted to CSR as well as pinpointing investment horizon as one of the factors that leads to an institutional shift towards CSR at the firm level. Consequently, our findings are useful for firm managers, investment funds, regulators and the wider activist community advocating for increases in CSR.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the details of the literature exploring the institutional demand for SRI and develops the framework of the hypotheses tested in the study. Section 3 describes the datasets we use and the methodology we employ. Section 4 reports and explains the empirical results of the study, and Section 5 provides a concluding discussion.
Related literature and development of hypotheses
The role of institutional ownership has become much more prominent in the last decades.
Aggregated data demonstrative of the shift in the overall ownership of stocks from retail investors to institutions are not available, but various estimates suggest that US retail investors owned approximately 90% of the stock market up until 1950, whereas the relevant percentage in recent years is in the vicinity of just 30-35% (Evans, 2009 ). The percentage of institutional ownership must have therefore correspondingly increased by a huge amount (55% to 60%) over the same period. The importance of this evolution becomes evident when one considers academic findings that suggest that institutional investors are less influenced by 'attention grabbing' stocks (Barber & Odean, 2008) , tend to be less myopic than individuals in terms of the strategies their holding firms are employing (Bushee, 1998) , play an important role in determining executive compensation (Hartzell & Starks, 2003) and, ultimately, significantly influence equity prices (Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Boehmer & Kelley, 2009) .
In spite of all the aforementioned evidence, very few aspects of the relationship between institutional equity ownership and CSR have been studied. Graves and Waddock (1994) are among the first to have looked into this in the early era of responsible investment and they could not find evidence that CSR has a discernible impact on the percentage of firm shares held by institutions. But this conclusion may very well be a result of the heterogeneity in the characteristics of institutional investors. Different types of investing entities have different priorities, preferences, risk tolerances and investment horizons, and hence they may have different attitudes towards CSR. Thus, when including all institutional investors in one category, irrespective of their very different characteristics, wrong conclusions, or no conclusions, can be drawn. Recognising this, subsequent studies on the same field looked at different types of institutional investors separately. Johnson and Greening (1999) find that pension fund holdings are positively associated with increased levels of diversity in the workplace and have better relationships with local communities and employees whereas none of these occur for the holdings of mutual funds and investment banks. Similarly, Cox, Brammer & Millington (2004) focus on the UK market and split institutional investors into a group comprising of pension funds, assurance funds and charitable funds, and a group made up of unit trusts and investment trusts. They find that the majority of the investors in the former group (which they label as being long-term oriented investors) have holdings that are positively associated with CSP. These results are broadly verified by Cox & Wicks (2011) who use a similar de facto categorisation of institutional investors as 'dedicated'
versus 'transient'.
Most recently, Harjoto, Jo and Kim (2015) go a step further by investigating the functional form of the link between institutional ownership and CSP and the potentially mediating role of institutional investment in influencing the association of CSP and financial risk. They find a curvilinear (reverse U shape) relationship between the two, meaning that there is a perceived optimal level of CSP above which institutional investors may not wish to increase their ownership in a firm. But the main takeaway from their study is that 'CSR decreases stock return volatility at a decreasing rate through its effect on institutional ownership' -a very interesting and novel observation.
Although all of the above-mentioned papers recognise the importance of institutional ownership in the constantly evolving field of SRI, they do not attempt to explicitly test the impact that the investment horizon of institutional owners has on their preferences for CSP.
Earlier empirical studies simply make no distinction between different types of institutional owners. Cox et al (2004) as well as Cox & Wicks (2011) note the significance of making a distinction between short-term and long-term institutional investors but their categorisation is depended on the legal or operating nature of each institution instead of their actual investing and trading behaviours (i.e. how often and how much they tend to rebalance the assets in their portfolios).
To the best of our knowledge, the study of Li & Lu (2015) is the only other paper in this area that employs a direct measurement of institutional investor horizon based on actual holdings.
However, the setting of this study is based on evidence from Chinese firms where a very large proportion of institutional ownership comes from the state and in fact the authors verify that 7 environmental performance seems to only be positively related to institutional ownership for state-owned enterprises. Our analysis also explicitly uses a direct measurement of institutional equity holdings and trading turnover to distinguish between short-term and long-term investors. However, it is based on US data where government/state ownership of publicly traded firms is much less important and hence institutional investment patterns are arguably more reflective of the true preferences for CSP in the marketplace.
Our ex ante hypotheses are that higher CSP will be positively associated with long-term institutional holdings and negatively associated with short-term institutional holdings. A significant body of conceptual academic work in strategic management has provided a framework that supports our assertions. Looking at corporate social responsibility from the perspective of the resource-based view of the firm, the work of Barney (1991) and Barney and Hansen (1994) suggests that corporate efforts to improve social welfare can create valuable reputational capital for the firm and add to its relational wealth with suppliers, employees, clients and other stakeholders. These efforts to increase CSP constitute complex social resources that are rare and hard to replicate; hence these efforts can lead to long-term, sustainable advantages. Barney and Hansen note that the networks of relations created via this avenue 'are developed over long periods of time ' (1994: 184) , so it would be sensible to assume that the relative impacts in the value of the firm also accrue in the long-run. Consequently, we would expect institutional investors with long term horizons to have a higher preference for higher CSP firms. Jones (1995) looks at firms as a nexus of contracts and provides an extensive conceptual framework suggesting that opportunism and self-interest can prevent firms from developing and maintaining long-term mutually beneficial relationships with their stakeholders, thus leading to higher monitoring costs, inefficient contracting and, ultimately, a competitive disadvantage.
Combining this work with Godfrey's (2005) arguments that CSR provides evidence of 'good corporate character' in favour of the firm and helps in building the aforementioned long-term relationship, further reinforces the point that the value of CSP is more relevant to long-run measurements of firm performance. Along very similar lines, Waddock and Graves (1997) note that 'such resource allocations may be strategically linked to improvements in long-term image and relationships with the communities with which it (the firm) must interact'. All of these arguments and positions are strongly reiterated in the work of Hillman and Keim (2001) . The authors argue that at least some strategic aspects of high CSP can be value creating in the longrun as the firm builds strong links with its primary stakeholders:
Relations with primary stakeholders… customers, employees, suppliers, community residents and the environment-can constitute intangible, socially complex resources that may enhance firms' ability to outperform competitors in terms of long-term value creation. (Hillman & Keim, 2001: 127) Given all the above, we expect that higher CSP will be a desirable characteristic for institutional investors who anticipate their investments to reap benefits in the long-run and as such tend to hold on to their equity for longer periods (i.e. have a lower trading turnover). We also expect the opposite to be true for institutional stock owners with short-run investment horizons: The implications of our study are not restricted to the arena of capital markets but instead can spread into the field on corporate decision-making on the part of managers and can influence the way business is conducted. Due to this, we find it useful to investigate whether the relationship between institutional ownership and CSP also runs from the former to the latter.
The often cited 'myopic institutions theory' (Hansen & Hill, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 1994) argues that higher institutional investment invariably creates pressures to meet short-term earnings and stock price goals. This, in turn, leads to reductions in innovative practices that require immediate investments but have long-term cash flow effects -such as R&D or practices increasing CSP. However, Bushee (1998) provides context to this theory and empirically demonstrates that it is true only for institutions who have a higher portfolio turnover and engage in momentum trading, i.e. they could be characterised de facto as short-term investors.
Otherwise, institutional ownership is actually positively associated with corporate projects yielding long-term benefits. Based on the above we posit:
Hypothesis 3: Long-term institutional ownership is positively related to subsequent increases in the CSP of the owned firms.
To our knowledge, the only previous study to have looked at a relationship running from institutional ownership to CSP is that of Dam and Scholtens (2012 6 Starting with the S&P 500 Index firms and the Domini 400 Social Index firms in 1991, KLD has expanded its coverage to incorporate the largest 1,000 US companies by market value since 2001, an expansion which advanced further in 2003 with the inclusion of the 3,000 largest US firms. 7 The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that all institutions operating in the US with discretion over 13F securities worth $100 million or more report all equity holdings greater than 10,000 shares (or $200,000) to the SEC at a quarterly frequency. 8 There are several reasons which could lead to a nominal institutional ownership rate being higher than 100% for a given firm. First of all, when investors share investment discretion, the security may be double counted (once for each institution). Secondly, when investors short sell a security, it will be recorded as a holding for both the lender and the borrower (short-seller) which will also lead to an overstatement of ownership. Thirdly, sometimes a firm's financial reporting date and institutional investors reporting date will not match perfectly. In this case, if a firm's total shares outstanding changed dramatically during this time gap, the base of ownership calculation could cause some data errors (Striewe, Rottke & Zietz, 2013) . To minimize the effects of these factors, we follow the same treatment as in Yan and Zhang (2009). Our results are robust when keeping those observations with more than 100% total institutional ownership in our sample.
community, diversity, employee relationship, environment and product. 9 The fact that the number of strengths and concerns within each CSP category has evolved over time, as KLD refined the database, makes it difficult to directly compare strengths (concerns) across years.
Therefore, we scale the strengths and concerns of each category to obtain two indices that range from 0 to 1. To be more specific, within a particular qualitative dimension for each firm-year we calculate adjusted dimension-level strength (concern) scores by adding all the ratings of the indicators for the strengths (concerns) and then dividing the sum by the maximum possible number of strengths (concerns). Then we compute dimension-level CSP scores as the net difference between adjusted dimension-level strength and concern scores for all five qualitative dimensions studied in the paper. The five dimension-level CSP scores are denoted as Community score (COM_CSP), Diversity score (DIV_CSP), Employee score (EMP_CSP), Environment score (ENV_CSP) and Product score (PRO_CSP). Finally, we construct three aggregate CSP measures:
overall strengths (AGG_S), overall concerns (AGG_C) and overall CSP (AGG_CSP). To calculate AGG_S (AGG_C), we simply sum the adjusted dimension-level strengths (concerns) across the five categories and then divide the sum by five. 10 To calculate AGG_CSP, we subtract the AGG_C from the AGG_S.
Measuring institutional ownership
We construct three institutional ownership measures. For a particular firm, we first measure its total institutional ownership (hereafter ) as the ratio between the number of shares held by institutional investors and the total number of shares outstanding. We then further classify institutional investors into short-term and long-term investors based on their portfolio turnover during the past four quarters. Short-term investors, by definition, buy and sell their investments frequently, which is reflected in high portfolio turnover. In contrast, long-term investors tend to hold their positions unchanged for a relatively long time period and thus are associated with low portfolio turnover. Therefore, portfolio turnover de facto serves as an intuitive criterion to distinguish long term investors from their short-term peers. Following Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) , for each institutional investor at time we calculate churn rate ( , , a measure of 9 Following Servaes and Tamayo (2013), we exclude corporate governance from our CSP construction because it is a mechanism that aligns the interest between shareholders and managers rather than a concern that deals with social objectives and stakeholders other than shareholders. Human rights has also historically been considered to be too broad of a category within KLD and not related to a particular group of stakeholders so it is also excluded from the analysis. 10 Following Hillman and Keim (2001) and Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin (2012) , we assume that each type of social action is given equal weighting so that employee programs, for example, are considered just as important as product safety and quality. Though not a perfect solution, in the absence of up-todate data on the relative importance of each dimension, this is what the literature has been employing.
how frequently the investor rotates her positions on all the stocks of her portfolio. More precisely, in quarter , investor 's churn rate is: 
, it means that investor does not change her portfolio at all during the period and thus her churn ratio is equal to zero as the numerator of Equation (1) becomes zero, suggesting that she is a long-term investor.
Next, we calculate each investor's average churn rate over the past four quarters:
Based on the average churn rate, at each year end we sort all investors into three tertiles. Those ranked in the top tertile with the highest _ , (top 33%) are classified as short-term institutional investors and those ranked in the bottom tertile are categorised as long-term investors. Finally, short-term (long-term) institutional ownership (hereafter and ) is constructed as the ratio between the number of shares held by short-term (long-term) investors and the total number of shares outstanding. Appendix 1 summarises definitions and data sources of various CSP and institutional ownership measures.
We have a total of 4,588 unique institutional investors with holdings in at least one firm in one year of our sample. It is worth noting that the average churn rate for short-term investors across all years is 15%, whereas for long-term investors it is just 2.2%. This essentially translates to shortterm investors rebalancing their holding at a pace of nearly 7 times faster than their long-term peers -a truly sizable differential. In addition, an important observation that should be highlighted is that when splitting our sample of institutional investors according to their 2) Share price (PRC) and stock turnover (TOV) to control for liquidity and transactions costs; and 3) Past returns (RET), earnings per share (EPS), and book-to-market ratio (BM) to control for expected future returns (see Fama & French, 1992) .
To account for industry-specific factors that may affect the relationship between and CSP, we include industry dummy variables, which are constructed based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. We also add year dummies in to account for changing economic conditions and more importantly the observed evolution of CSP-related recognitions and practices. Appendix 2 summarises definitions and data sources for those control variables.
Equation (3) In Equation (4), we are interested in variables AGG_S and AGG_C, which enable us to breakdown overall CSP and allow for asymmetric effects of strengths and concerns on future institutional ownership.
Literature has established a positive relationship between CSP and firm financial performance. In particular, the benefits of responsible performance have been argued to accrue in the long term, and as such could be enjoyed mainly by long-term investors. This rationale provides incentives to these investors to promote CSR practices once they become shareholders so that they reap the respective financial rewards in the long-run. To empirically test this hypothesis, we estimate the following reduced-form model:
In Equation (5) Table 2 presents the pairwise correlations among all variables used in the paper. Almost all of the correlation coefficients among control variables are quite low (less than 35%), suggesting that multicollinearity should not affect our analysis. The exception to this, expectedly so, comes from the high correlations between market value, log of stock price and index membership. Iteratively dropping each of these variables from our model specifications does not change our results. 
Main results
This section presents our main empirical results. We first investigate the impact of a firm's overall CSP score on its future institutional ownership. We next zoom in on specific aspects of firms' CSR activities. More precisely, to further understand the mechanism through which CSP is associated with institutional ownership, we look at overall strengths, overall concerns and dimension-level CSR scores (e.g. COM_CSP, DIV_CSP, EMP_CSP, ENV_CSP and PRO_CSP), respectively. Lastly, we examine whether and how (e.g. through enhancing strengths or reducing concerns) long-term investors, as shareholders, promote future CSR activities. Table 3 contains the results, focusing on overall CSP. The insignificant coefficient of the main CSP variable (AGG_CSP) in column 1 implies that institutional investors as a whole might not factor in CSP when they make investment decisions. However, this finding might just as well be the result of the opposite attitudes toward CSR of long-term and short-term investors, as we explained in Section 2. Specially, it is possible that mixing the two types of investors under the same umbrella buries the true effects of CSP and leads to the insignificant outcome. To disentangle the possibly differing attitudes towards CSR for long-term and short-term investors, we replace the independent variable TIO in specification 1 (representing total institutional ownership) with SIO and LIO in specifications 2 and 3 (representing long-term and short-term institutional ownership respectively). The negative and significant coefficient of AGG_CSP in column 2 indicates that short-term investors do consider CSR in their decision-making models and they tend to avoid firms with higher CSP. On the other hand, column 3 shows that long-term investors are attracted by CSR and prefer to invest in socially friendly firms. These findings are consistent with our prediction and more importantly, highlight the usefulness of recognizing the significant role that investment horizon plays in determining CSR effects on institutional ownership. The negative bias in the CSP-firm performance link established in the literature and discussed in Section 2 of this paper suggests asymmetric effects of strengths and concerns on future institutional ownership. To empirically test the theory, we replace overall CSP with strengths (AGG_S) and concerns (AGG_C) and re-estimate our model. Indeed, results in Table 4 show that firms' positive and negative social actions affect investors' preference differently. The negative coefficients of AGG_S and AGG_C in column 1 imply that institutional investors as a whole (when not categorising them according to their investment horizon) dislike both strengths and concerns, which is in stark contrast with the finding in column 1 of Table 3 that institutional investors have an indifferent attitude toward CSR. The two contradicting results are consistent with Godfrey, Hatch and Hansen's (2010) argument that the process of netting a firm's social strengths and concerns 'obscures more than it reveals'. More importantly, when taking into consideration investor horizon, the results in columns 2 and 3 suggest that long-term investors' preference for firms with higher CSP, as displayed in Table 3 , is mainly driven by an avoidance of firms with higher social controversies, whereas the negative relationship between CSP and shortterm ownership is largely caused by short-term investors' avoidance of firms with higher social strengths. The overall CSP of a firm is the combination of its performance in several dimensions, including community, diversity, employee relationship, environment and product. The aggregation of the five dimensions of CSR activities into a single measure, AGG_CSP, facilitates our analysis, which reveals the general relationship between CSR and institutional ownership. However, individual dimensions may offer additional informative content and enable us to investigate the difference between and relative importance of those dimensions in terms of their influence on firm performance and thus future institutional ownership. Table 5 shows that the impacts of the five dimensions are heterogeneous. Results in columns 1 through 6 indicate that, among the five dimensions, only firms with better employee relationship and higher product quality from a social perspective attract long-term investors. Short-term investors, on the other hand, seem to only pay attention to the environment and product dimensions of CSR activities, as the negative and significant coefficients of ENV_CSP and PRO_CSP in columns 11 and 12 suggest. In particular, our findings in columns 7 through 12 reveal that the previously discussed negative association between short-term ownership and CSR largely reflects short-term investors' disfavour of firms with higher ENV_CSP and PRO_CSP. It is worth noting that the product dimension is the only common dimension that both long-term and short-term investors consider when they select their investment. Table 5 Institutional investors' preference of specific CSP dimensions Table 5 displays the regression results of various measures of institutional ownership on measures of specific CSP dimensions and other control variables. Dependent variables SIO and LIO denote ownership of short-term institutional investors and long term institutional investors respectively, measured at year t+1. Long-term and short-term investors are defined based on churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009) . All independent variables are in the current year t. Variables of interest are COM_CSP, DIV_CSP, EMP_CSP, ENV_CSP, PSQ_CSP, representing the standardized CSP scores of Community, Diversity, Employee, Environment and Product, from KLD database. Control variables include firm size (LOGMV), natural log of firm age (LOGAGE), natural log of stock price (LOGPRC), Book to market ratio(BM), CAPM beta of stock (BETA), idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK), quarterly stock turnover (TOV), earnings per share(EPS), index membership dummy (S&PIDX), dividend yield (DY), leverage (DTA). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust tstatistics are reported in brackets.
How do CSR activities affect institutional ownership?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Do long-term institutional investors promote CSR, and if so, how?
Rational long-term institutional investors would promote CSR of their invested firms if, as the literature argues, positive corporate social activities yielded long-run financial benefits. Table 6 reports the results of estimating Equation (5). More precisely, the dependent variable in specification 1 is overall CSP (AGG_CSP) one year after the investor bought shares of the firm, and the dependent variable in specification 2 is AGG_CSP five years after the purchase. As shown in column 1 of Table 6 , enters into the regression with a positive and significant coefficient, confirming the intuition that long-term investors promote overall CSP. Interestingly, comparing the results in columns 1 and 2, the positive association between and overall CSP is enhanced both statistically and economically as we increase horizon from one year to five years. This finding may suggest that it takes time for institutional ownership to materially impact the culture of a firm and lead to higher levels of CSP. It is worth noting that the lagged dependent variable ( _ ) has a positive and significant coefficient in both columns 1 and 2, providing evidence that a firm's CSP is persistent over time and supporting the argument that CSP activities are rooted in corporate culture.
We look at the asymmetry between strengths and concerns by regressing overall strengths and concerns, separately, on and control variables. Columns 3 through 6 in Table 6 contain the results. We employ AGG_S (AGG_C) one year after the investor's purchase of the firm's shares as the dependent variable in column 3 (5), and AGG_S (AGG_C) for the respective five year point as the dependent variable in column 4 (6). Overall, it appears that as shareholders, long-term investors not only increase positive social activities but also decrease social controversies.
Interestingly, our analysis further reveals a certain asymmetry between the two types of activities. Specifically, the insignificant coefficient of in column 3 combined with the significant coefficient in column 4 indicate that long-term investors promote social strengths rather slowly. In contrast, results in column 5 suggest that long-term investors almost immediately reduce controversies after becoming shareholders. This may have to do either with the asymmetric financial effects of concerns versus strengths, as we previously noted (greater for the former), or it may be that it simply takes more time, know-how and overall resources for a firm to proactively do good than to reduce its socially/environmentally harmful activities. expect to an even lesser extent an immediate change in CSP, given changes in the profile of the institutional owners of a firm. This is due to the sizeable upfront costs and time constraints that are frequently associated with changing the social and environmental output of a given firm.
Nevertheless, it needs to be recognised that every feedback process like the one we have found is dynamic and as such there may be a part of the interaction between the two variables that occurs in a contemporaneous fashion. A further concern arises from the potential omitted We first look at the causality that goes from CSP to institutional ownership (our Hypothesis 1).
Following Benlemlih and Bitar (2016) , we use as instruments the initial level of the firm's overall CSR score ( _ _ ) and the industry-year average of overall CSR scores ( _ _ ).
These two instruments are likely to be correlated with the firm's contemporaneous CSR score (the relevancy condition) and are unlikely to be endogenous to the firm's contemporaneous institutional ownership (the exclusion restriction). Our IV approach consists of two steps.
_ _ and _ _ are used as instruments in the first stage regression:
where we include in the same control variables as in Equation (3). In the second stage regression, we re-estimate Equation (3) by replacing AGG_CSP with _ , the predicted value of overall CSP from Equation (6).
The two-stage lease squares (2SLS) regression results are contained in Table 7 . We find in the first stage regression estimates that the two IVs are highly significant with expected signs (column 1). The results of the second stage regressions are presented in columns 2 through 4.
The insignificant (column 2), negatively significant (column 3) and positively significant (column 4) coefficients of _ clearly show that investment horizon matters and short-term investors tend to avoid firms with higher CSP, whereas long-term investors tend to do the opposite, reinforcing our earlier baseline regression findings regarding Hypothesis 1. is a dummy equal to 1 if firm leaves (enters) the Russell 2000 index and 0 otherwise. The relevancy condition of our IVs is satisfied because the index reconstitution apparently affects the long-term institutional ownership in all firms. At the same time, the exclusion restriction is also satisfied because the only index assignment rule is mechanically based on the rank of stock market capitalisation, which is random, conditional on firm size. To put it differently, switching between the two Russell indexes itself should not have any direct effect on their CSR activities.
We include in the same control variables as in Equation (5). In the second stage regression, we re-estimate Equation (5) by replacing with , the predicted value of long-term institutional ownership from Equation (7). Table 6 , supporting our baseline analysis conclusion regarding Hypothesis 3, that long-term investors improve overall CSP of their owned firms (columns 2 and 3) by reducing controversies (columns 4 and 5) and promoting social strengths (columns 6 and 7). The dependent variables in the second stage regressions AGG_CSP, AGG_C and AGG_S denote standardized overall CSP score, CSP concerns score and CSP strengths score respectively. The dependent variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 are measured at the t+1 year while the dependent variables in columns 3, 5 and 7 are measured at the t+5 year. All independent variables are in the current year t. Control variables include total institutional ownership (TIO), firm size (LOGMV), book to market ratio (BM), return on assets (ROA), and leverage ratio (DTA). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2.Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Our study investigates the impact that investment horizon has on institutional investors' preference for corporate social performance. Unlike previous literature, we use a direct measure of institutional investors' trading frequency and, consequently, the average duration of their holdings, in order to distinguish between long-term and short-term investors. In addition, we explore to what extent the well-established asymmetry in stakeholder perception (and financial impact) between positive and negative CSP outcomes also influences institutional demand for the associated firms. Finally, we expand our exploration in order to identify whether there is also a link running in the opposite direction, i.e. if long-term/short-term investors also attempt (and manage) to influence corporate culture and change the levels of corporate social performance of the firms in their portfolios.
Our results are revealing and intuitive as they are highly aligned with the predictions that stakeholder theory makes regarding the value-relevant impacts of stronger CSP -which should manifest in the long-run (Jones, 1995) . Indeed, we show that although institutional ownership as a whole appears to be unrelated to the CSP of invested firms, long-term investors prefer higher CSP and short-term investors tend to avoid it. These results are also in line with the conclusions of Bushee (1998) , who finds that the levels by which firms are held by long-term investors are inversely associated with 'managerial myopia'. Such companies tend to be less pressed to provide immediate results to their investors and hence appreciate resources that are more likely to generate rather delayed returns (such as R&D investments or improved CSP).
Additional exploratory analysis reveals that long-term investors' preference for higher CSP is mainly driven by a significant avoidance of firms associated with more controversies whereas the negative link between short-term owners and CSP is primarily a result of their dislike for corporations with more social/environmental strengths. Lastly, long term investors seem to promote an overall betterment of the social performance of the firms they own but this improvement takes time -as results are stronger when we look at 5-year horizons. Hence, the picture that emerges is one of a 'virtuous circle' between long-term institutional ownership and CSP, where one pushes the other to higher levels.
The results are of tremendous importance for firm managers. Executives who are proponents of the ethical and financial incentives for better CSP (especially via the avoidance of any controversial practices) can rest assured that their initiatives will be appreciated by long-term investors who will also, in turn, push for further improvements in this direction. Individual AGG_CSP Overall CSP score, calculated as the sum of yearly adjusted individual CSP scores of the five main qualitative issue areas: community, diversity, employee relationship, environment, and product. For each dimension, adjusted CSP is computed by taking the net difference between adjusted strength and concern scores.
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AGG_S
Overall Strength index, calculated as the sum of yearly adjusted individual Strength scores of the five main qualitative issue areas: community, diversity, employee relationship, environment, and product.
KLD Database
AGG_C
Overall Concern index, calculated as the sum of yearly adjusted individual Concern scores of the five main qualitative issue areas: community, diversity, employee relationship, environment, and product.
KLD Database
COM_CSP Community score, calculated by taking the net difference between adjusted community strength and concern scores.
DIV_CSP
Diversity score, calculated by taking the net difference between adjusted diversity strength and concern scores.
KLD Database
EMP_CSP Employee score, calculated by taking the net difference between adjusted employee strength and concern scores.
ENV_CSP
Environment score, calculated by taking the net difference between adjusted environmental strength and concern scores.
KLD Database
PRO_CSP
Product score, calculated by taking the net difference between adjusted product strength and concern scores.
KLD Database
TIO
Total institutional ownership, calculated as yearend shareholdings of all institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding.
13F Database
LIO
Long-term institutional ownership, calculated as yearend shareholdings of long-term institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding. At each year end, institutional investors are classified as long-term or short-term based on their churn rates.
13F Database
SIO
Short-term institutional ownership, calculated as yearend shareholdings of long-term institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding. At each year end, institutional investors are classified as long-term or short-term based on their churn rates.
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